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EDUCATION AT A DISCOUNT: QUALIFYING FOR
RESIDENT TUITION AT STATE UNIVERSITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
After the Supreme Court's decision in Shapiro v. Thompson'
invalidated welfare residency requirements as an impermissible
infringement on the right to travel interstate, students who were
challenging residency requirements for in-state tuition assumed
their cause had been greatly aided. They contended that if res-
idency requirements were impermissible for welfare, they were
also impermissible for other state benefits, particularly higher
education.2 Hopes for the death of the nonresident tuition fee
proved unwarranted, however, for the students' contention was
rejected.
In Twist v. Redeker,3 a student at the State University of Iowa
appealed a trial court's dismissal of his complaint which had
alleged that higher nonresident tuition violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Holding that a reasonable addi-
tional fee for nonresident students which distributes more evenly
the cost of operating the institution between residents and non-
residents does not constitute an unreasonable and arbitrary clas-
sification violative of equal protection, 4 the court relied heavily on
Clarke v. Redeker,5 an earlier challenge to the same nonresident
tuition fee decided before the Supreme Court's decision in Sha-
piro v. Thompson. The plaintiff in Clarke was a law student at the
State University of Iowa who had resided in Illinois prior to his
'Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The statutory provisions held invalid
made residence in the state for one year a condition for receiving welfare benefits. The
Court held that the one-year residency requirement infringed upon the right to travel
interstate, a fundamental right, though the Court refused to define the source of this basic
constitutional right. Since a fundamental right was infringed, the Court applied the stricter
compelling state interest test in finding that the statutes violated the equal protection
clause. But the Court noted that "even under traditional equal protection tests a classifica-
tion of welfare applicants according to whether they have lived in the State for one year
would seem irrational and unconstitutional." 394 U.S. at 638.
2 For an extensive argument that nonresident tuition charges violate the interstate
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, § 2 of the Constitution, see Clarke, Validity
of Discriminatory Nonresident Tuition Charges in Public Higher Education Under the
Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause, 50 NEB. L. REV. 31 (1970).
3 Johns v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 878 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom., Twist v.
Redeker, 396 U.S. 853 (1969).
* Id. at 883.
* 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
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enrollment and had married a lifelong resident of Iowa. Conceding
the impossibility of determining the extent of cost-equalization
provided by the difference in tuition charges between residents
and nonresidents, the court nevertheless upheld the classification
on the ground that it had a "rational relation to Iowa's object and
purpose of financing, operating, and maintaining its educational
institutions." 6
Both the Twist and Clarke opinions assumed that the classifica-
tion between residents and nonresidents for tuition purposes was
to be judged according to the traditional test for equal protection,
which accords validity to a legislative classification as long as it is
not arbitrary or capricious and bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate legislative objective.7 The issue of whether Shapiro's
more stringent compelling state interest test was applicable
to tuition fee cases was not determined until 1971, when the
Supreme Court finally ruled specifically on the constitutional is-
sues raised by nonresident tuition charges and the equal protec-
tion clause. 8 In Starns v. Malkerson9 the Court affirmed in a
61d. at 123. For an earlier case upholding the validity of nonresident tuition, see
Landwehr v. Regents of the University of Colorado, 156 Colo. 1, 396 P.2d 451 (1964)
(classification of students into two groups for tuition purposes held a matter of legislative
determination which is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable).
7 The "traditional" test for equal protection is most often applied to the general areas of
tax and police power legislation. By applying the traditional test, the Court exercises
minimal review in these areas. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61 (19 11) (statute prohibiting the pumping from wells of certain mineral waters upheld as
valid exercise of state police power); American Commuters Ass'n v. Levitt, 279 F. Supp.
40 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (nonresidents held to lack standing to challenge denial of tuition-free
university education, Welfare, and medicaid).
8 Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), dismissed
on appeal, 396 U.S. 554 (1970), was the first case to reach the Supreme Court
which squarely raised the issue whether the more stringent compelling state interest test of
Shapiro was applicable to tuition fee cases. An Ohio woman who married a resident of
California sought to invalidate California's requirement that in order to attain residency
status for tuition purposes she must live in the state one year before enrolling in college.
Relying on Shapiro, she contended that the residency requirement infringed the fundamen-
tal right to interstate travel in violation of the equal protection clause. The Supreme Court
nevertheless dismissed the case for lack of a substantial federal question. 396 U.S. 554
(1970).
The same argument had also not persuaded the California Court of Appeals in the
preceding litigation. That court attached great significance to a footnote in the Shapiro
opinion which purported to disavow any view of the validity of residence requirements for
state benefits other than welfare payments. 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21 (1969). Interpreting the
footnote to mean that the same standards did not necessarily apply to other residency
requirements, the court rejected the compelling state interest test for tuition residence
requirements since it found that the California residency requirement does not infringe
upon the right to marry or the right to travel. 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 439, 78 Cal. Rptr.
260, 266 (1969). Using the traditional "rational basis" test, the California court upheld the
residency requirement as a legitimate manifestation of the legislature's desire to provide
lower tuition to those persons who have already contributed to the cost of their education
by paying state taxes.
9401 U.S. 985 (1971).
Resident Tuition
memorandum opinion the lower court decision upholding the va-
lidity of Minnesota's statutory requirement that a person reside in
the state for at least one year in order to qualify for resident
tuition. 10 Distinguishing Shapiro, the district court held the com-
pelling state interest test inapplicable since the one year waiting
period "does not deter any appreciable number of persons from
moving into the state"; that is, the waiting period does not infringe
upon the right to travel." Thus, in affirming the district court in
two brief sentences, the Supreme Court quashed the hopes for the
demise of the nonresident tuition fee generated by Shapiro only
three years earlier.' 2
Although the Starns decision forecloses debate on the con-
stitutionality of residence requirements for tuition at state univer-
sities, it by no means resolves all constitutional questions raised
by the application of the nonresident tuition fee. One recurring
problem is the reclassification of those students initially classified
as nonresidents who have thereafter decided to become residents
of the state13 and thereby seek to take advantage of the lower
tuition offered to residents.' 4 This article identifies the major
difficulties in changing classification and analyzes some of the
constitutional questions concerning the application of the nonresi-
dent tuition fee subsequent to Starns. Additionally, the article
examines the extent to which proposed model legislation on tui-
tion residency solves the existing objections to the application of
the nonresident tuition fee at state universities.
II. THE CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION AGAINST
RESIDENCY FOR TUITION PURPOSES
Current state regulations governing nonresident tuition defy
precise categorization. While fifteen states prescribe the rules for
residency by statute, about half the states delegate the respon-
sibility for promulgating these rules to state higher education
governing boards or to the boards of trustees of individual in-
10 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970).
11 Id. at 237-38.
12 The Starns decision has already had an effect on the lower courts. Finding that case
controlling, the Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld Nebraska's waiting period which
required residence in the state for at least four months without attending school. Thomp-
son v. Board of Regents, 187 Neb. 252, 188 N.W.2d 840 (1971).
13 The general problem of reclassification, with particular application to Texas regu-
lations, is discussed in Note, Residency, Tuition, and the Twelve Month Dilemma, 7
HOUSTON L. REV. 241, 249-55 (1969).
14 For the requisities of changing domicile or permanent residence, see note 37 and
accompanying text infra.
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stitutions. 15 In a few states each institution's administrators and
faculty or state education coordinating agencies have the power to
formulate the rules. 16 Still other states' rules are an amalgam of
statutory policy and administrative regulation.' 7 Although the
substance of the residence rules varies widely, the regulations
almost uniformly provide that in order to qualify for resident
tuition the nonresident student must live in the state for periods of
up to one year prior to enrolling in the educational institution. 8
The waiting period presents a formidable barrier for those stu-
dents who wish to attain resident status while attending
school.' 9 Indeed, an implicit legislative objective in some states is
apparently to increase the difficulty of attaining resident status.
By establishing a conclusive presumption that a person is not a
resident for tuition purposes until he has lived in the state for a
stated period of time, the states seek to further two major policies.
First, the waiting period is often justified as a means of allocating
the cost of higher education between residents and nonresidents
of the state. As the California Court of Appeals explained in Kirk
v. Board of Regents, 20 charging lower tuition fees to those per-
sons who have lived in the state for at least one year is a "reason-
able attempt to achieve a partial cost equalization," because these
persons "directly or indirectly, have recently made some contri-
bution to the economy of the state through having been employed,
having paid taxes, or having spent money in the state .. "21
Second, the waiting period is often justified on the ground that
it provides lower tuition only to those persons who intend to
remain in the state permanently and thereby prove their
domiciliary intent. Intention to remain permanently, of course, is
closely related to the cost equalization objective, since a resident
who intends to reside in the state permanently will contribute his
share of the cost of higher education by paying state taxes to the
same, if not greater, extent than those persons who have lived in
the state in the past. Thus the California Supreme Court replied to
15 R. CARBONE, RESIDENT OR NONRESIDENT? TUITION CLASSIFICATION IN HIGHER
EDUCATION IN THE STATES I- 12 (Education Commission of the States 1970). Typical
statutes delegating authority to set nonresident tuition fees are OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3345.01 (1967) and MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 390.554 (1968).
16 R. CARBONE, supra note 15, at I 1- 12.17 1d. at 12.
18 Id. at 14-15.
19 For those aggrieved by the regulations an internal appeals mechanism is usually
available, though the procedure for appeals of reclassification decisions is by no means
always apparent from the regulations. Id. at 30.
20 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969). See note 8 and accompanying text
supra.
21 Id. at 444, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 269. See also Johns v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 878 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom., Twist v. Redeker, 396 U.S. 853 (1969).
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an early challenge to the state's tuition residence requirement
under the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution by
explaining that the expenditures for education are a "heavy bur-
den upon the taxpayers of the State." 22 The court went on to
uphold the residence requirement by stating:
Taxes are payable annually and the requirement that a stu-
dent shall maintain a residence in the state of California
during one taxation period as an evidence of the bona fides of
his intention to remain a permanent resident of the state and
that he is not temporarily residing within the state for the
mere purpose of securing the advantages of the university,
cannot be held to be an unreasonable exercise of discretion
by the legislature .... 23
Since the only way to qualify for resident status in some states
is to live in the state for a period of time before enrollment,2 4 the
student who enters one of the state's institutions of higher educa-
tion is forced to retain his nonresident classification despite his
desire to remain in the state permanently. In other states that
permit residency to be established by living in the state while not
attending an educational institution, the student must disrupt his
education if he wishes to qualify for resident status; otherwise, he
must retain his nonresident classification and continue paying
substantially higher tuition fees.
In effect, then, many states' regulations preclude students from
becoming residents for tuition purposes once they have been
classified as nonresidents. This situation suggests an analogy to
other "closed classifications" which have been invalidated under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 25 In
22 Bryan v. Regents of the University of California, 188 Cal. 559, 561, 205 P. 1071,
1072 (1922).
2 Id. at 561-62, 205 P. at 1072.
24 For example, Oklahoma's regulations state: "Attendance at an educational institution
is interpreted as temporary residence: therefore, a student neither gains nor loses residence
status solely by such attendance." R. CARBONE, supra note 15, at 18.
25 The Court has adhered to the theory that a legislative classification which is so
restrictively written as to deny persons the opportunity to come under its terms denies
equal protection of the laws. Thus, a statute which exempted one company from a general
licensing requirement was held invalid under the equal protection clause because it created
a closed classification into which others similarly situated could not enter. Morey v. Doud,
354 U.S. 457 (1957). This approach has been applied particularly to legislative classifica-
tions on the basis of race. Such classifications are inherently discriminatory since they are
based on a factor that cannot be changed. The traditional rational basis test does not apply
to racial classifications which will be upheld only upon a clear showing of necessity to
further a valid legislative objective. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)
(invalidated criminal statute making cohabitation of interracial couples an offense), and
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (state exclusion of Blacks from jury panels
held violative of equal protection).
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Carrington v. Rash,26 for example, the Supreme Court struck
down as a denial of equal protection a provision of the Texas
constitution which prohibited a member of the armed services
who moved to Texas during his military duty from ever estab-
lishing residence for voting purposes. No other group of persons
in the state was similarly prevented from changing its nonresident
for voting purposes. The Court held that "[b]y forbidding a soldier
ever to controvert the presumption of nonresidence, the Texas
Constitution imposes an invidious discrimination in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 27 Admittedly, Carrington involved
the fundamental right to vote which the Court has repeatedly held
demands close judicial protection,28 and it is indeed doubtful in
light of Starns2 9 that the right to attend a state university as a
resident of the state stands on a parallel constitutional footing.
Yet, insofar as Carrington renders conclusive presumptions
against residency suspect, it cannot be viewed as totally in-
applicable to the problem of residency for tuition purposes. Since
the Minnesota regulations involved in Starns afforded an oppor-
tunity for reclassification, the Supreme Court has not yet squarely
ruled on the validity of regulations which deny students the means
of changing their tuition status. 30 While the issue could be dis-
tinguished from the voting question in Carrington, the more com-
pelling view, and certainly the more "popular" one, is that a
conclusive presumption against change of residency for tuition
purposes is invalid.
At least one court has held that such a presumption violates the
equal protection clause. In Newman v. Graham31 an. Idaho stat-
26380 U.S. 89 (1965).
27 Id. at 96.
28See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, reh. denied, 379 U.S. 870 (1964), where the
Court stated that
the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.
Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged
infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticu-
lously scrutinized.
377 U.S. at 561-62.
See also Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (provision of
New York law requiring voter in school election to own or lease taxable property or to
have a child enrolled in school held invalid under equal protection clause).
29401 U.S. 985 (1971), affg 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970).
30 The plaintiffs in Starns relied on Carrington to argue that since the language of
Minnesota's statute required a year's residence before enrollment, it set up an uncon-
stitutional "closed classification." The district court met this contention by interpreting the
statute as creating only a rebuttable presumption which "can be overcome if the student
provides sufficient evidence to show bona fide domicilary within the state, one element of
which is proof that he has resided within the state for a period of one year." 326 F. Supp.
at 240.
31 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (1960).
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ute which provided that a student retained his initial nonresident
status throughout his college career was held unconstitutional
since it did "not afford any opportunity to show a change of
residential or domiciliary status."3 2 On the other hand, the Su-
preme Court of Colorado thought that the state's conclusive pre-
sumption against change of residency by students was neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable, though the reasons for the court's
conclusion were not explained.33
Even in states that afford the opportunity to be reclassified, the
student bears the heavy burden of proving that he qualifies for
classification as a resident of the state. Although the question of a
student's residency for tuition purposes essentially involves a
factual determination in each case, the current tuition statutes and
regulations contain few, if any, guidelines for making this determi-
nation. In most states minors, unless married or emancipated,
have the residence of their parents.3 4 In all other cases, intent is
the determinative factor for establishing residency.3 5 The student
must demonstrate to the appropriate administrative official that' he
regards the state as his- permanent home, not merely a temporary
home during his student years.36 Inevitably, in order to prove his
intention to remain in the state the student must establish con-
nections with the state apart from his education.3 7 As one writer
has said:
The general principle followed by most states seems to be
that-while ownership of property, payment of taxes, regis-
tration of an automobile, voting registration and similar fac-
tors are to be considered in residency determination-they
are in themselves insufficient to support a claim of resident
status. 8
The ultimate determination necessarily leaves much to the dis-
32 Id.
33 Landwehr v. Regents of the Univ. of Colorado, 156 Colo. 1, 396 P.2d 451 (1964).
The Colorado statute attacked was COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 124-18-3(3) (1964), which
provides:
An unemancipated minor or adult student who has registered for more than 5
hours per term shall not qualify for change in his classification for tuition
purposes unless he shall have completed 12 continuous months of residence
while not attending an institution of higher learning in the state or while in the
armed forces.
34 R. CARBONE, supra note 15, at 14.
35 People v. Osborn, 170 Mich. 143, 135 N.W. 921 (1912) (adult student who regarded
college community as his permanent residence held entitled to vote in college town).
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 (19 1).3 7 See, e.g., Kaplan v. Kuhn, 8 Ohio N.P. 197 (1901) (student who had adopted
university city as his permanent residence held entitled to lower tuition fee). See also
Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 497 (1962).
38 R. CARBONE, supra note 15, at 16.
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cretion of an administrative official whose decision is subject to a
limited scope of judicial review.3 9
III. EFFECT OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT
ON RECLASSIFICATION
The twenty-sixth amendment's extension of the franchise to
persons eighteen years of age or older 40 and the attendant prob-
lem of students' establishing voting residence in their college
towns have great significance in establishing residence for tuition
purposes. For example, shortly after the passage of the amend-
ment five students in Kentucky challenged that state's presump-
tion that a person who lists his occupation as "student" has not
met the domiciliary requirement of the voting regulations. The
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky held
that this presumption against student residency could not with-
stand scrutiny under the equal protection clause: "Simply put
there are no salient reasons to treat registering students differently
from other people merely because they are students." 41 Earlier,
the Michigan Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in
Wilkins v. Ann Arbor City Clerk.42 In response to the contention
that students lacked sufficient connection with the university com-
munity to be considered residents, the court pointed out "numer-
ous interrelationships between students, their local communities,
and the State of Michigan.' 43 Some of the connections with the
state and college community cited by the Michigan court bear
directly on the establishment of student residency in general:
Students pay state tax, city income tax (if any), gasoline, sales
and use taxes ... As the United States Supreme Court has
recognized, property taxes are ultimately paid by renters such
as some of the appellants. In addition, Michigan explicitly
39 In Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, 124 (S.D. Iowa 1966), the court states: "In
reviewing a determination of an administrative body, a Court is normally limited to
ascertaining whether the administrative action was arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious
or unlawful."
40 The twenty-sixth amendment to the Constitution provides that "[tihe right of citizens
of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of age."
41 Bright v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp. 527, 533 (E.D. Ky. 1971).
42385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971). See also Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565,
488 P.2d I, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1971), where the California Supreme Court held that the
twenty-sixth amendment prohibits voting officials from requiring that young people who
consider their university residence to be their domicile register and vote in their parent's
district. The court said: "[T]he twenty-sixth Amendment is intended to compel adult
treatment of minors for voting purposes ..... Id. at 572, 488 P.2d at 5, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
701.
43 385 Mich. 670, 690, 189 N.W.2d 423, 432 (1971).
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recognizes this fact by allowing all renters a 17% exemption
on rent paid in lieu of the exemption that property owners
receive for payment of property taxes. Students with children
can and do enroll them in the public school system, and,
therefore, have more than a passing interest in educational
standards of the community. 44
Since the Kentucky and Michigan opinions involve in-
fringements of the fundamental right to vote,45 they can be dis-
tinguished from the tuition residency situation. Yet much of the
reasoning of these cases is applicable to proof of residency for
tuition purposes. Indeed, one court has bridged the gap between
establishing residence for voting and for tuition payments.4 6 The
Judge of the Seventeenth Judicial District of Kansas held that the
enfranchisement of eighteen year olds by the twenty-sixth amend-
ment means that they are no longer dependent on their parents for
residence. 47 The court specifically ruled that the college had the
burden of proof to show that the student claimant who registered
to vote in the town in which he attended a state junior college was
not a resident of the junior college district.48 Although the facts of
this case applied to charging nonresident tuition to students out-
side the junior college district, though not necessarily outside the
state of Kansas, the decision could easily be extended to include
students from out of state seeking residency status.4 9
If the reasoning of the Kansas court is followed, the twenty-
sixth amendment may have supplied students with a new legal
argument to attack out-of-state tuition. Rebuffed in their efforts to
challenge the nonresident tuition fee on a constitutional basis in
Starns and similar cases, student opponents of the nonresident
tuition fee may ultimately succeed by attacking the application of
the nonresident classification.
IV. EFFECT OF MARRIAGE ON RESIDENCE STATUS
A frequent problem in the administration of nonresident tuition
regulations is the effect of marriage on the nonresident's
44 Id. at 689-90, 189 N.W.2d at 431-32.
45 See note 28 supra.
46 Board of Trustees of Colby Community Junior College v. Benton, No. 5258 (17th
Judicial District of Kansas, Jan. 3, 1972). See also news reports of this unpublished
opinion: N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1972, at 16, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1972, § 4, at I1,
col. 4.
47 Board of Trustees of Colby Community Junior College v. Benton, No. 5258 (17th
Judicial District of Kansas, Jan. 3, 1972).
48 Id. at 5.
49 The portion of the opinion dealing with residence is being appealed to the Supreme
Court of the State of Kansas.
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domiciliary -status. Normally, a woman acquires her husband's
residence upon marriage, since residence in such circumstances is
considered derivative. 50 But for purposes of assessing nonresident
tuition different rules have been applied. Here, as in other areas of
the application of the nonresident tuition charge, the governing
rules vary from state to state, and even from institution to in-
stitution. In Clarke v. Redeker51 the court held that a state-
supported university may reasonably classify a nonresident stu-
dent and his resident spouse as residents of the same state.
However, the court continued: "This does not mean that it is
required to do so. Such classifications should be left to the sound
discretion of the appropriate University officials." 52 Marriage it-
self is not determinative of the question of residency for tuition
purposes in the court's view, but "should merely be a factor in
determining residency classification. " 53
Other courts have taken the more extreme position that mar-
riage does not alter the residency status of a nonresident for
tuition purposes. Thus, when an Ohio resident argued in Kirk v.
Board of Regents54 that by marrying a California resident she
acquired California residence, the court agreed, but nevertheless
ruled that she must pay the nonresident tuition fee until she had
completed the one year waiting period required by California
regulations:
[l]t does not logically follow from this fact [that petitioner
became a resident of the state upon marriage] that for tuition
purposes, petitioner should be allowed to retroactively take
advantage of the period of her husband's residence prior to
the marriage, and be classified as a resident student.55
One curious characteristic of most rules in this area is that they
discriminate against males. In most states it is easier for females
to attain resident status by virtue of marriage than for males. 56 In
a recent Supreme Court decision which invalidated a state statute
discriminating against women, 57 the Court viewed sex as a clas-
50 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 21 (Proposed Official Draft No. 5,
1969): "A wife who lives with her husband has the same domicile as his unless the special
circumstances of the wife make such a result unreasonable."
51 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
52 Id. at 124.
53 Id.
54273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1969).
55 Id. at 436, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (1969).
56 R. CARBONE, supra note 15, at 20.
57 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). A mandatory provision of the Idaho probate code
gave preference to men over women for appointment as administrators of decedents'
estates. It was argued that the statute served a legitimate state purpose of reducing the
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sification requiring a greater showing of state interest in order to
withstand constitutional scrutiny under the equal protection
clause. While this decision might supply nonresident males with a
ground for challenging tuition regulations that discriminate against
men, the issue would more likely be resolved without reaching the
constitutional questions. Courts might well adopt the approach
that the Clarke court used to construe a tuition residency regu-
lation which by its terms dealt only with reclassification of non-
resident females and omitted any reference to nonresident males
in similar situations.5 8 The Clarke court attributed little signifi-
cance to the omission, explaining that "[tlhe fact that there is not
a similar guideline for male students involved in such a marriage
does not prevent the appropriate University officials from consid-
ering his marriage when he is attempting to overcome the rebut-
table presumption of nonresidency." 59 Presumably, the court's
reasoning would apply to a regulation which specifically treated
nonresident men and women differently; nevertheless, the issue
has not been directly confronted.
V. MODEL LEGISLATION ON STUDENT RESIDENCY
Recognizing the need for reform in the area of the reclassifica-
tion of students for residency purposes, the Education Commis-
sion of the States, an independent association of governors, chief
state school officials, and legislators in forty-seven states, has
drafted model legislation to deal with this problem. 60 While the
workload of the probate courts, since the statute operated to eliminate hearings on the
merits of potential administrators of opposite sex. The Supreme Court disagreed.
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of
the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is
to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said
as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in
this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex.
... By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus
similarly situated, the' challenged section violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
Id. at 76-77. By striking down the Idaho statute on traditional equal protection grounds,
the Court avoided deciding whether sex is a suspect classification to which -the compelling
state interest test is applicable.
58 The regulation contested in Clarke provided:
The residence of a wife is that of her husband. A nonresident female student
may attain residence through marriage, and correspondingly, a resident fe-
male may lose residence by marrying a nonresident. Proof of marriage should
be furnished to the Registrar at the time change of status is requested.
259 F. Supp. 117, 124 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
59 1d.
6 0 EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, MODEL ACT FOR CLASSIFICATION OF
STUDENTS FOR TUITION PURPOSES AT PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
[hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT].
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Model Act is not designed to meet each state's individual needs, it
is offered as a general guide to state legislatures considering
revision of their student residency rules. The heart of the Model
Act is the broad governing rule that "every person having his
domicile in this State shall be entitled to classification as an
instate student for tuition pruposes." 61 Domicile is defined by the
Act as "a person's true, fixed, and permanent home and place of
habitation. It is the place where he intends to remain, and to
which he expects to return when he leaves without intending to
establish a new domicile elsewhere." 62 Who qualifies under this
definition is, of course, the crucial consideration under the Model
Act, as well as under all other student residency legislation.
The Model Act establishes two categories of persons for pur-
poses of tuition classification: those who are emancipated from
their parents and those who are unemancipated. An "emanci-
pated" person is one "who has attained the age of 18 years, and
whose parents have entirely surrendered the right to care, custo-
dy, and earnings of such person and who no longer are under any
legal obligation to support or maintain such person." 63 Emanci-
pated persons coming from another state to attend an institution
in the state for the first time are presumed not to have acquired
domicile in the state unless, before the opening day of school,
they have resided in the state for the period of time required to
vote for state officials. 64 By making domicile for nonresident tui-
tion purposes dependent upon acquisition of voting residence,
the Model Act has made a novel compromise. It has implicitly
retained the much maligned waiting period requirement, but has
tied this period to the state's voting laws. In many ways, the effect
of the Model Act would be to reduce the waiting period substan-
tially.65
61 MODEL ACT § 3(l).
62 Id. § 2(3).
6 Id. § 2(4). Since the Model Act does not specify when a parent's legal obligation
toward his child terminates, resort must be made presumably to state law. Generally the
parental obligation ends when the child attains the age of majority, though the duty may
continue when necessary. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 105 Pa. Super. 232, 161
A. 883 (1932), where a father was required to support his adult daughter because she was
an invalid incapable of self-sufficiency. A parent's legal obligation may be terminated
earlier in many states if the minor, having attained "years of discretion," maintains a way
of life separate from his parents, as for instance by marrying. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22, commentf(Proposed Official Draft No. 5, 1969).
64 MODEL ACT § 4().
6 In Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269 (U.S. March 22, 1972), the Supreme Court
struck down Tennessee's three month county residency requirement for voting as a
violation of the equal protection clause since the state was unable to show a compelling
state interest for the length of the residence period. The Court suggested that a thirty day
period would be a more appropriate residence requirement for voting purposes, although it
did not specifically hold that a longer period would be constitutionally proscribed. In light
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For those emancipated students who do not qualify for resi-
dent tuition upon enrollment, either because they cannot attain
voting residence or because they were unemancipated minors at
that time, the Model Act permits subsequent reclassification upon
a "clear demonstration" that they have established domicile in the
state. 66 But in making reclassification decisions, the appropriate
administrative official must apply the Model Act's rebuttable pre-
sumption that the domicile of an emancipated person receiving
regular financial assistance from his parents or whose parents'
income was taken into account in furnishing scholarships or loans
is that of his parents.67 Apparently, the extent of financial assis-
tance is not a relevant factor in these decisions. The Model Act
by this provision adds a significant barrier to reclassification, since
many students are to some degree financially dependent upon
their parents. Ironically, a higher nonresident tuition fee may be
the factor that necessitates parental aid since it significantly in-
creases the cost of the student's education. Under the Model Act
the student who cannot assume these costs alone must bear a
greater burden of proof in demonstrating that he intends to reside
in the state permanently. Arguably, a student's financial self-
sufficiency bears little or no relationship to his domiciliary intent,
and the Model Act may therefore be introducing an extraneous
factor into the reclassification process.
The Model Act's most notable feature is that it attempts to
relate qualifications for tuition residency to other state residency
requirements. Unfortunately, the drafters chose to restrict this as
well as other reclassification provisions to "emancipated" in-
dividuals, while treating quite differently persons whose parents'
legal obligation toward them still exists. The domicile for tuition
purposes of these "unemancipated" students is that of their par-
ents; 68 therefore, an unemancipated student who initially comes
from another state will in all instances be classified a nonresident
and will be subject to the out-of-state tuition charge of the pub-
licly assisted educational institution.6 9 This result is unaffected by
of the Supreme Court's preference for relatively brief residency requirements for voting,
the drafters of the Model Act may wish to reconsider the provision of the Act which ties
the tuition residency period with voting residency requirements, since they may feel that a
brief period such as thirty days may not be sufficient to manifest a student's domiciliary
intent.
66 MODEL ACT § 4(2).
67 Id. § 4(5).
68 Id. § 3(2).
69 An exception to the Act's general rule that the domicile of an unemancipated person
is that of his parents is provided by § 3(4) which states: "Any person who remains in this
State when his parents, having theretofore been domiciled in this State, removes from this
State, shall be entitled to classification as an in-state student (until attainment of the degree
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the student's qualification as a resident for voting purposes or
acquisition of other significant connections with the state.
To declare that because a student is legally dependent upon his
parents for support he cannot attain permanent residence apart
from his parents' home state may be politically palatable, but it is
not particularly equitable. Since domicile is a matter of intent, it is
illogical to say only emancipated students can acquire permanent
residence in the state. Intent does not turn upon age; nor should
the distinction between residents and nonresidents for tuition
purposes. In addition, the Model Act's position raises the
spectre of an unconstitutional "closed classification," since the
unemancipated student is denied the opportunity to qualify for
lower tuition even though he may be able to prove intent to
remain in the state permanently. The importance of the Act as an
improvement of the current law is diminished to the extent that all
members of the university community are not given an equal
opportunity to achieve resident status.
The Model Act takes a liberal position on the issue of marriage
and nonresident tuition by prescribing as a "rule" for determining
tuition status the proposition that the "spouse of any person who
is classified or is eligible for classification as an in-state student
shall likewise be entitled to classification as an in-state student." 70
This position eliminates the waiting period requirement and the
problems of proving domiciliary intent for persons who marry
permant residents of the state. Furthermore, the language of the
Act makes no distinction between the treatment of men and
women, thereby avoiding objections to the Act as discriminatory
on the basis of sex.
In order to prevent the unreasonable arbitrary exercise of the
administrative official's discretion, the Model Act mandates
that the state-wide agency concerned with higher education prom-
ulgate uniform criteria for determining tuition status and uniform
procedures for appellate review of the official's decisions. 71 This
feature of the Act obviates the necessity of resorting to judicial
action in the first instance, yet it is not specific enough to
guarantee that the appropriate values will be considered. The
state education authority is free to provide an appellate process
that satisfies the requirement of form but fails in substance. The
composition of the review board is critical to the value of the
appellate procedure. If students and faculty are not represented
for which he is currently enrolled) so long as his attendance at a school or schools in this
State shall be continuous."
70 MODEL ACT § 3(5).
71 Id. § 5.
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on the board, the appellate process might result in little more than
an administrative rubber stamp. Legislatures adopting the Model
Act should therefore consider making the review provisions more
explicit in order to ensure the infusion of broader representation
into the administrative decision-making process.
Except for the provision which attaches tuition residency to
voting residency,72 there is little that is new or innovative in the
Model Act. Yet the Act, merely by codifying some of the more
equitable features of existing rules, is far superior to most states'
current tuition regulations. Opponents of nonresident tuition fees
may be chagrined by the Model Act, since it does not eliminate
the nonresident fee; certainly, that is not one of its objectives.
Nevertheless, the Model Act does provide a greater opportunity
for a student who has decided to change his permanent residence
to the state where he attends school to qualify for the lower
resident tuition fees. The absence of the opportunity for reclassifi-
cation remains the most fundamental objection to existing res-
idency rules. By alleviating at least some of these objections, the
Model Act presents a better alternative than most current res-
idency regulations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Starns and its predecessors firmly established the right of a
state to impose a residency requirement for lowered tuition fees at
state-supported institutions of higher education. The assault on
the nonresident tuition fee, long the object of scorn by students
who come from other states, is likely to shift from focusing on the
exaction of the fee to scrutinizing its application. Tuition regu-
lations which create impenetrable barriers to reclassification or
or discriminate on the basis of sex are vulnerable to constitutional
attack. But even absent any constitutional infirmities, tuition regu-
lations will continue to supply ground for combat in the legisla-
tures and courtrooms. The concern of legislatures with the oper-
ating costs of the universities and the concern of students with
liberalizing the qualifications for the lower tuition charge are in
essential conflict. The extent to which these competing interests
are accommodated is the measure of any legislation in this area.
The Model Act attempts to reconcile these interests by expanding
the opportunity for emancipated students to attain resident status,
while denying similar opportunity to unemancipated students. The
result is an adequate, though imperfect, document.
-Barry D. Glazer
72 Id. § 4(I).
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